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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO MISSOURI LAWYERS
CARL C. WHEATON*
[Ed. This is the concluding installment of the article begun by Professor
Wheaton in 11 Missouri Law Review 1. In order to compare the text of
the present Rules of Civil Procedure with the text of the same rules if the
proposed changes were adopted, throughout this article the rules have been
printed as follows: those words which it is proposed to eliminate have
been printed in bold face type and enclosed in parentheses. Material which
it is proposed to insert in the rule has been italicized.]
RULE 50. MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND
FOR JUDGMENT.
(a)(WHEN MADE: EFFECT) MOTION FOR DIRECT-
ED VERDICT. A party who moves for a directed verdict at
the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evi-
dence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion
had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not
granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties
to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a
directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.
(b)(RESERVATION OF DECISION ON MOTION)
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. (Whenever a motion for a di-
rected verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or
for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have sub-
mitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination
of the legal questions raised by the motion.) Within 10 days
after the reception of a verdict, a party who has moved for a
directed verdict at the close of all the evidence may move to (have)
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B., 1911, Leland Stanford Univer-
sity, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme Court
Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
(77)
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set aside the verdict and any judgment entered thereop (set
aside) and (to have) for judgment (entered) in accordance with
his motion for a directed verdict. (; or if a verdict was not re-
turned such party, within 10 days after the jury has been dis-
charged, may move for. judgment in accordance with his mo-
tion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be
joined with this motion, or a new trial may be *prayed for in
the alternative. If a verdict was returned the) The court may
allow the verdict or judgment to stand or may (reopen the judg-
ment) set it aside and either order a new trial or direct the entry
of judgment (as if the requested verdict had been directed) for
the moving party. The making of a motion for judgment in con-
formity with the motion for a directed verdict shall not be neces-.
sary for the purpose of raising on review the question whether the
verdict should have been directed or whether judgment in con-
formity with the motion for a directed verdict should be entered.
If no verdict (was) is returned, the court on motion made within
10 days after the jury has been discharged may direct the entry
of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may
order a new trial.
A motion for a new tfial, as an alternative, may be joined
with a motion for judgment. If the motion for judgment is granted,
the couet in its discretion may either decline to rule upon the mo-
tion for new trial or rule upon it by determining whether it should
be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed. The
making of such a conditional order on the motion for new trial, or
the declining to make such an order, does not affect the finality of
judgment. In case the alternative motion for new trial has been
conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal,
the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court shall have
otherwise ordered. In case the alternative motion for new trial has
been conditionally denied and the judgment is reversed on appeal,
subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the
appellate court. If the district court, when granting the motion for
judgment has declined to rule upon the motion for a new trial and
if on appeal -the judgment is reversed the district court shall then
dispose of the motion for a new trial unless the appellate court shall
have otherwise ordered.
The proposed changes in the main title to Section 50 and to sections
(a) and (b) thereof more nearly indicate their contents than do their
present titles.
The first paragraph of Rule 50 (b) is deleted, since the advisory
committee believes that the court, without reserving the right to do so,
[Vol. 11
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and without being deemed to have reserved that right, has the power to
enter a judgment in accordance with a previous motion to direct a verdict
at the close of all the evidence. The history of the legal warfare over this
issue will be easily recalled by all lawyers. Briefly it is this. In Slocum v.
New York Life Insurance Company76 the majority held that a circuit court
of appeals, when reversing a judgment of a trial court because of error
in refusing to instruct the jury that the evidence was insufficient to support
such a verdict, could not direct that a judgment be entered contrary to
the verdict, but must award a new trial. The decision was based on the
seventh amendment to the constitution which gives one the right to a trial
by jury in all actions of common law involving more than twenty dollars.
In a strong dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Hughes, concurred in
by three other justices, it was said that the seventh amendment was not
involved. The argument was that the appellate court's judgment did not
involve a question of fact. Whether the evidence was sufficient to take the
case to the jury, which was the question decided by the court when it
rendered a judgment for the defendant, was surely a question of law. Hence
there were no facts to be decided by a jury. In support of this conclusion,
Justice Hughes cited Chinowetk v. Haskell.7 7 In that case the Supreme
Court held that, on appeal from a judgment overruling a demurrer to
the evidence, the appellate court, upon finding that the demurrer should
have been sustained, could remand the case with a direction to enter
judgment for the defendant in the trial court.
In Baltirore & Carolina Line v. Redan7T the Supreme Court decided
that the appellate court could direct a judgment for the defendant, though
there had been a verdict for the plaintiff, since the trial court, when sub-
mitting the case to the jury, had expressly reserved its ruling on the de-
fendant's motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict.
Finally, by adopting Rule 50, the Supreme Court must have taken
the position that an appellate court may direct a judgment for the defendant
in such a case, though the trial court does not expressly reserve its ruling
on a motion for a directed verdict when it submits a case to a jury without
ruling on such a motion.
One may well ask how effective a rule is to reserve the right of a
judge to make a decision on a motion after verdict when that rule merely
76. 228 U. S. 364 (1913).
77. 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 92 (1830).
78. 295 U. S. 654 (1935).
19461
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says that "the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion."
This writer believes that those words are merely window dressing and
that, in effect, the Supreme Court.has adopted the dissent of Justice Hughes
in Slocusm v. New York Life Inszrance Company as the law on this matter.
Therefore, the proposed deletion of the initial paragraph of Rule 50
(b) is in order. Of course, as the advisory committee says,") if the Supreme
Court has not receded wholly from its position in the Slocum case, the
deletion would be improper.
The third sentence of Rule 50 (b) in the suggested revision thereof,
is entirely new and provides that an appellate court may determine whether
the verdict should have been directed as requested or whether judgment
should be entered in conformity with the motion for a directed verdict,
though the losing party makes no motion after verdict requesting such
action and though the trial court fails of its own motion to grant a
judgment in favor of the losing party. Although the majority opinion per-
mits this practice under the present rule,80 there appears to be at least one
decision opposing it.81 Hence, if this practice is desirable, it would be well
to write it into this rule. That it is desirable seems clear, for it is a time
saver.
The first sentence of the new paragraph which it is proposed should
be added to Rule 50 (b) is a partial redraft of the present form of the
third sentence of this rule, which, under the suggested revision of the rule,
is deleted. The new form permits one to move for judgment and to join
therewith a motion for a new trial as an alternative. The current form per-
mits one to join a motion for a -new trial with a motion for a judgment or
to request a new trial as an alternative. The second sentence of the new
form further provides that, if the motion for judgment is granted, the trial
court may refuse to rule on the motion for a new trial or it may decide
whether to grant a new trial if the judgment which it grants to the losing
79. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 56, 57.
80. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F. (2d) 611 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940), reversed on other
grounds, 312 U. S. 492 (1941); United States v. Halliday, 116 F. (2d) 812 (C.C.A.
4th, 1941), reversed on other grounds, 315 U. S. 94 (1942); Howard University v.
Cassel, 126 F. (2d) 6 (App. D. C. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 675 (1942); Low-
den v. Bell, 138 F. (2d) 558 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943); Commentary (1941) 4 Fed. Rules
Serv. 934; MooRE's FEDPERAL PRACrICE (1938), Cumulative Supplement § 50.04.
81. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 117 F. (2d) 510 (C.C.A. 8th,
1941).
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party is vacated or reversed. It should be noticed that the present practice
approved by the Supreme Court is that, if alternative prayers or motions
are made to a trial court for judgment or a new trial, the Court must rule
on both motions, 8" whereas, the suggested practice would permit the Court
to decline to make an alternative ruling on the motion for a new trial. The
advisory committee does not state why it proposes this variation in the
present federal practice. It is, therefore, difficult to evaluate the committee's
suggestion. It may be justified on the grounds that the disposition of a
motion for a new trial is ordinarily not subject to appeal8 3 and that the
rules should be elastic.
The third and fourth sentences of the new paragraph adopt the view
of the seventh circuit that the granting of a new trial does not cancel
out a contemporaneously granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The granting of the new trial is not acted upon unless the judgment not-
withstanding the verdict is reversed on appeal and the appellate court
makes no order nullifying the order granting a new trial.8 4 The basis of
this rule is that, since the judgment and the order for the new trial are
both in favor of the same party, the latter is tentative and becomes oper-
ative only if the judgment is overruled on appeal 5 In the third circuit,
it has been held that the granting of an unconditional new trial in addition
to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict vacates the latter. The Court
claims that this view is supported by the Supreme Court's holding in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v- Duncan. It says that, though the Supreme
Court there said that, if a court granted a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, it should also grant a new trial, the new trial referred to is one in
which it is specifically stated that it will be effective only if the judgment
is reversed. It bases this conclusion on the statement of the high court in
that case that, if "the judgment were reversed, the case, on remand, would
be governed by the trial judge's award of a new trial.' '86 This argument is
not valid. The court in making that observation merely stated the effect
of a grant of a new trial and was not describing the terms of an order
granting a new trial which would have that effect. Since there is a conflict
82. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U. S. 243 (1940).
83. Ibid. p. 196.
84. McIlvaine Patent Corporation v. Walgreen Co., 138 F. (2d) 177 (C.C.A.
7th, 1943).
85. Ibid. See also 37 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcCE (1938), Cumulative Supple-
ment § 50.03.
86. 311 U. S. 243, 254 (1940).
1946]
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of authority on the effect of an order granting a new trial under these
circumstances, it is well to state in this rule the position which the Supreme
Court has taken in relation thereto.
The last sentence in this new paragraph is commendable. As the rule
permtis the trial court to forego ruling on a motion for a new trial when
it rules on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is
well that provision should be made for disposition of the former motion
after appeal, if the judgment of the trial court is reversed and if the
appellate court does not rule in relation to a new trial. Otherwise there would
be a motion which would never be ruled on.
RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT.
(a) EFFECT. In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury, or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and
direct the entry of the appropriate judgment; and in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary
for purposes of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall
be considered as the findings of thecourt. If an opinion or memor-
andum of decision is ffled, the findings of fact and conclusions of
law may be incorporated as a part of the opinion or memorandum.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on a decision
of a motion -under Rules 12 and 56 or any other motion except as
provided in Rule 41 (b).
The suggested addition in the first sentence of this rule makes it clear
that the rule applies in cases where there is an advisory jury. Professor
Moore interprets the rule as presently written to cover such cases. He says
this is necessarily true, because the court "must adopt or reject the findings
(of such a jury) as its own.' '8r That is, if there is an advisory jury, the
court makes the findings as is required by Rule 52 (a).
There has been considerable controversy whether, under Rule 52 (a),
a judge of a district court may properly include findings of facts and of
conclusions of law in an opinion. Several courts have held that this may
not be done, but that such findings must be stated separately from any
87. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcricE (1938) 3119. In accord with this result,
see Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F. (2d) 796 (App. D. C. 1943).
[Vol. 11
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opinion."" Courts have gone so far as to say that "it is now a work of
supererogation to write a considered and detailed opinion on the facts" in
a non-jury cause, "for the place of the opinion must now be taken by
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated and
numbered."8 9
This conclusion has, in some cases, been based upon the holding of the
Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 304 U. S. 55
(1938).1 0 In this decision, the Supreme Court considered Equity Rule 70%
which reads, in part: "In deciding suits in equity, . .., the court of first
instance shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon." The court held that the rule had not been followed be-
cause there were no formal findings and the court had not found the facts
specially and had not stated its conclusions of law separately as the rule
required. It said, further, that the opinion of the court, which included
various findings of fact, was not a substitute for the required facts and
that a discussion of portions of the evidence and the court's reasoning did
not constitute the special and formal findings by which it was the court's
duty appropriately and specifically to determine all of the issues which the
case presented. The case was remanded and the trial court was directed
to state its findings as required by Equity Rule 20Yz. There was a dissent
by Justices Stone and Black to the effect that they thought that the
opinion and decree of the district court, while informal, were sufficient for
the purposes of decision.
In contrast to these decisions, there have been a number which with-
out referring to the Interstate Circuit case, have held that it is unnecessary
to state the findings of fact and law separately from an opinion if it is
.said in the opinion that the statements of fact and of legal conclusions are
intended as findings of fact and as rulings of law in accordance with Rule
52. 11 In Matton Oil Transfer Corporation v. The Dynanmic,2 the court'
88. Schwartz v. Hygo Musical Products Co., 25 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1938);
Penmac Corporation v. Esterbrook Steel Pen Manufacturing Co., 27 F. Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bums Publications, 28 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting
Annuities v. Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Co., 43 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Ohio, 1941).
89. See 27 F. Supp. 86 and 43 F. Supp. 5, supra n. 87.
90. See 25 F. Supp. 408,27 F. Supp. 86, and 28 F. Supp. 399, supra n. 87.
91. Green Valley Creamery, Inc. v. United States, 108 F. (2d) 342 (C.C.A.
1st, 1939); Wellman v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 868 (D. Mass. 1938); Cook v.
United States, 26 F. Supp. 253 (D. Mass. 1939); Proctor v. White, 28 F. Supp. 161
(D. Mass. 1939). See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 7 Fed. Rules Service 883 (E.D.
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said, referring to Admiralty Rule 46 , which is substantially the same as
Rule 52 (a), that the insistence of the Supreme Court upon appropriate
findings should not be disregarded and that trial courts would not find it
unduly burdensome to state findings briefly when they made decisions.
The court added that it did not wish to preclude trial courts from preparing
opinionsY3 On appeal, it was said in Carter Coal Co. v. Litz94 that, though
the trial court did not file separate formal findings of fact and conclusions of
law, it had set forth findings and conclusions in its opinion. Hence, the court
refused to remand the case to the district court for formal findings and con-
clusions. Robert Oglebay, assistant to the official reporter for the advisory
committee during 1942-1944, has said that, while a mere discussion of the
facts and evidence in an opinion may not comply with Rule 52 (a), the
better view is that findings and conclusions, if clearly stated, may be con-
tained in a written opinion. 5
The writer is of the opinion that, as 52 (a) now reads, it requires a
separate statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that in-
clusion thereof at different points of an opinion is inadequate. The very
words of the rule require this, as do decisions of the Supreme Court. This
is apparent from the opinions in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
already discussed herein,"6 and in Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Company."7
In the latter case the court said that it was of the highest importance that
there should be fair compliance with Rule 52 (a). It stated further that
the observations made in the course of the opinion were not findings of
fact. In conclusion, the court said that, if there was a further hearing, any
action taken by the court should be upon findings of fact and conclusions
founded upon the evidence, in accordance with Rule 52 (a). Of course,
it is possible to argue that these Supreme Court decisions permit including
findings and conclusions in ordinary opinions, but this seems extremely
doubtful.
Pa. 1943). A long list of lower court cases holding that Equity Rule 70 1/2 was
satisfied by including findings and conclusions in an opinion is found in the Federal
Digest under Courts, § 352 (8).
92. 123 F. (2d) 999 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
93. That findings should be filed with opinions is suggested in United States
v. Forness, 125 F. (2d) 928 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942), cert. denied 316 U. S. 694 (1942).
94. 140 F. (2d) 934 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944).
95. Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law (1944) 18 J. or NAT'L
Ass'N OF REF. 68, 69.
96. See supra p. 83.
97. 309 U. S. 310 (1940).
(Vol. 11
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It is desirable, therefore, for the advisory committee to present the
problem of the interpretation of the first sentence of Rule 52 (a) to the
Supreme Court for solution. This it has done by proposing the addition
of a sentence to Rule 52 (a) which permits findings to be included in
opinions.
The second sentence which it is suggested should be added to Rule
52 (a) states the view of the courts that this rule does not apply to de-
cisions in proceedings on motions in which there is no trial on the facts.
Thus, it has been held that this rule does not apply to proceedings on mo-
tions for summary judgments, because such cases are tried on the law, not
on the facts,9 8 and because such cases do not involve final hearings and
submissions.9 9 Similar results have been reached upon like reasoning in
connection with motions to dismiss. 100 Although it is probable that Rule 52
(a) would be given the interpretation proposed in the suggested addition
thereto, the possibility of contradictory decisions makes it advisable to in-
clude in the rule a statement of the desired interpretation thereof.
RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS.
(b) JUDGMENT AT VARIOUS STAGES. (When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court at
any state, upon a determination of the issues material to a par-
ticular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim,
may enter a judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment
shall terminate the action with resplect to the claim so disposed
of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In
case a separate judgment is so entered, the court by order may
stay its enforcement until the entering of a subsequent judg-
ment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are
necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose
favor the judgment is entered.) When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as claim, counter-claim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, judgment may be entered as fol-
lows: (1) when all claims arising out of a single transaction or
98. Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Petrill, 43 F. Supp. 768(E.D. Pa. 1942); Somers Coal Co. v. United States, 2 F.R.D. 532, 533 (N.D. Ohio,
1942).
99. Pen-Ken Oil & Gas Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 2 F.R.D. 355
(E.D. Ky. 1942).
100. Thomas v. Peyser, 118 F. (2d) 369 (App. D.C. 1941); Lucking v. Delano,
122 F. (2d) 21 (App. D.C. 1941); Schad v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 136
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occurrence have been decided final judgment may be entered on
those claims; (2) when one or more but less than all claims arising
out of a single transaction or occurrence have been decided and the
court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay
and so orders, final judgment may be entered. If at the time judg-
ment is entered upon any claim, any other claim or claims, whether
or not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, have not
been adjudicated, the court may stay the enforcement of any
judgment so entered until the entry of a subsequent judgment
and may prescribe suck conditions as are necessary to secure the
benefit of the prior judgment to the party in whose favor it was
entered. If an order or other form of decision, however designated,
adjudicates less than all claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and
third-party claims arising out of a single -transaction or occurrence
and if the court has not directed entry of final judgment as above
stated, the action is not thereby terminated as to the claims so
adjudicated and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
such claims.
This rule, which Judge Charles Clark says is, in substance, "the pre-
existing rule in equity providing for split judgments in extended cases,""'0
has resulted in considerable confusion, even among members of the same
court, due largely to difficulty in determining when all matters arising out
of a transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the plaintiff's claim
have been decided.102 This creates uncertainty among lawyers as to what
should be done when a trial court grants a final judgment before the case
is fully determined. If a final judgment is granted and no order is made
staying its enforcement, it is unsafe not to appeal, yet the appellate court
may hold that the judgment appealed from was not a final judgment, since
all matters arising out of the transaction or occurrence which was the
subject of the plaintiff's claim have not been decided.10 3
The advisory committee has proposed a rule which is entirely new in
form. It says that the first two sentences thereof state more precisely the
substance and intent of the present rule than does that rule. 0 4 It is sug-
gested that the new form goes beyond the present one. To-day the "claim
101. Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Manufacturing Co., 126 F. (2d) 621, 624 (C.C.A.
2d, 1943).
102. Ibid.
103. For examples of this see Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F. (2d) 406 (C.C.A.
2d, 1940); Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Manufacturing Co., 136 F. (2d) 621 (C.C.A.
2d, 1943); Toomey v. Toomey, 149 F. (2d) 19 (App. D.C. 1945).
104. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 62.
[Vol. 11
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for relief" appears to refer to the plaintiff's claim, whereas, under the pro-
posed form "claim for relief" includes claims, and third-party claims.
Today, on the face of the rule, separate judgments may be entered if there
has been a decision on a claim of the plaintiff and on all counterclaims
arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the claim. Under the suggested revision, there can be no partial judgment
unless there has been a decision on all claims of all parties arising out of
a single transaction or occurrence. This may well be a better rule than the
present one, but I wish to point out that the committee is not correct
in saying that this is a restatement of the present rule, though the com-
mittee may be stating in the new form of the rule what it thought it said
in the present form thereof.
Attention is called to (2) of the first sentence. The final clause thereof
is "judgment may be entered." Although this surely means that judgment
may be entered as to the claims concerning which a decision has been
reached, it does not say so. As the clause reads, final judgment might be
entered on the entire case. This verbal, uncertainty could be remedied by
inserting the word "thereon" between "judgment" and "may."
As stated by the advisory committee, the last sentence of the sug-
gested revision of this rule, if adopted, will make it unlikely that a court
will enter what appears to be, but is not, a valid final judgment.' 0 ' This
is true, for it contains clear directions when, and when not, to enter a final
partial judgment.
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
(a) FOR CLAIMANT. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the (pleading in answer thereto
has been served), expiration of 20 days from the commencement
of the action, move with or without supporting affiidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time specified
for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that, (except as to the
amount of damages), there is no genuine issue as to any' material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a mat-
105. Ibid.
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ter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although, there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
The suggested deletion and substitution in Rule 56 (a) permits one
to move for a summary judgment at any time after twenty (20) days
from the commencement of an action rather than at any time after answer.
This may shorten the time within which one may make such a motion,
since it permits such a motion twenty days after a complaint is filed. 1'0'
Under the present rule the plaintiff may not be able to make that motion
within that time, since the complaint may not be served for several days
after it is filed and the defendant need -not answer the complaint for another
twenty days.1 7 Moreover, the interjection into the case by a defendant
of other motions prior to answer may further delay the time when a motion
for a summary judgment may be made. It should be noticed, that, under
this rule, a motion for a summary judgment by a defendant is not the
equivalent of an answer. Thus, it has been held that a plaintiff's counter-
motion for a summary judgment may not be filed prior to answer. 08 Mr.
Armstrong believes that this suggested change, and a similar one in Rule
26 (a), relating to the taking of depositions without leave, would occasion-
ally result in an inequality of operation similar to that complained of when
the expiration of a term gave finality to judgment entered during the term.
He suggests that uniformity could be attained by permitting the taking
of depositions without leave and moving for summary judgments "only
when twenty days have expired since service of the complaint. '1o0 This
might result in uniformity, but it might also delay proceedings unduly.
Under Rule 56 (c), as it is now written, the Supreme Court has said:
"Where the undisputed facts leave the existence of a cause of action depend-
ing on questions of damage which the rule has reserved from the summary
judgment process, it is doubtful whether summary judgment is warranted
on any showing."" 10
As has been said by the editor of the Federal Rules Service, this doubt
which the court expresses is unwarranted by the rule.' 1' The exception
106. Rule 3.
107. Rule 12.
108. Peoples Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 58 F. Supp. 25
(N.D. Cal. 1944).
109. Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rides of
Civil Procedure (1945) 31 A.B.A.J. 497, 499.
110. Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp. 321 U. S. 620, 623-624 (1944).
111. Commentary, 7 Fed. Rules Serv. 974.
[Vol. 11
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as to the amount of damages was not intended to mean that there could
be no summary judgment relating to the amount of damages where the
existence of a cause of action depended on the amount of damages. Cer-
tainly there is not such a difference between the nature of an issue as to
damages and one as to another fact that those issues should be treated
differently in respect to summary judgments. It is submitted that what
the present rule means is that the existence of a genuine controversy as
to the amount of damages, whether the amount of damages does or does
not determine the existence of a cause of action, is no bar to a summary
judgment, if there is no controversy as to the existence of all of the elements
of a cause of action, including any required amount of damages.
The advisory committee, by the deletion and substitution therefor in
Rule 56 (c), has attempted to provide that there may be a summary judg-
ment where the existence of a cause of action depends on questions of
damage. This may have been accomplished, but it would be wise to insert
between "fact" and "and" some such word as "including facts relating to
damages." Otherwise some courts may believe that the substitution is
the equivalent of the deletion.
RULE 58. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
Unless the court otherwise directs, judgment upon the verdict
of a jury shall be entered forthwith by the clerk, but the court
shall direct the appropriate judgment to be entered upon a special
verdict or upon a general verdict accompanied by answers to inter-
rogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49. When the court
directs (the entry of a judgment) that a party recover only money
or costs or that (there be no recovery) all relief be denied, the
clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the
direction; but when the court directs entry of judgment for other
relief, the judge shall promptly settle or approve' the form of the
judgment and direct that it be entered by the clerk. The notation
of a judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule 79 (a) con-
stitutes the entry of the judgment; and the judgment is not effective
before such entry. The entry of the judgment shall not be delayed
for the taxing of costs.
In suggesting the deletion of "the entry of a judgment" the advisory
committee is not proposing any change in the meaning of this rule but
is merely recommending the elimination of an unnecessary phrase. In ad-
vising changing "there be no recovery" to "all relief be denied," it suggests
the use of language having a broader meaning than that now. in use. As is
19461
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said in the Second Preliminary Draft,112 the "phrase 'all relief be denied'
covers cases such as the denial of a bankrupt's discharge and similar situ-
ations where the relief sought is refused but there is literally no denial of
a 'recovery.'" The addition of the sentence stating that the entry of a
judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs would make it clear
that clerks are to enter judgments promptly without waiting for the taxing
of costs. 13 This is in line with the doctrine, long held by federal courts,
that a judgment may be final, though the amount of costs to be recovered,
as set forth therein, is left blank' 14 and should speed up the taking of appeals.
To the writer, the proposed changes seem to be commendable.
Mr. Chandler objects "to the idea of the clerk entering a judgment
especially upon an accepted offer by a party, "since it will be pregnant with
possible future embarrassment to the Court," especially where judgments,
under Rule 68, are based upon accepted offers. He doubts, however, that
this objection is, as a practical matter, serious, as few judges will permit
the clerk to enter judgments without their approval, except one for dis-
missal or for a sum certain and, in many districts, judges, notwithstanding
the rules, require all judgments to be submitted to them for approval.15
It is doubted that judges will be embarrassed, if clerks enter judgments
only in the cases in which" Rule 58 permits them to do it, and if they enter
them properly.
RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENTS.
(b) TIME FOR MOTION. A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment, (ex-
cept that a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence may be made after the expiration of such
period and before the expiration of the time for appeal, with
leave of court obtained on notice and hearing and on a showing
of due diligence.)
The advisory committee, as will later be seen," 6 has recommended
that Rule 73 (a) be amended so as to reduce to thirty (30) days the time,
in most instances, in which one may appeal from a judgment. If this
112. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 67.
113. Ibid.
114. Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U. S. 549 (1891); Brown v. Parker, 97 Fed. 446
(C.C.A. 8th, 1899).
115. Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1945) 31 A.B.A.J. 497, 500.
116. Infra" pp. 98-99.
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suggestion were adapted, one would, under the present wording of Rule
59 (b), have only thirty (30) days after judgment in which to move for
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The committee
believed that this would be too short a time within which to require the
making of such a motion. This is probably correct, since the new evidence
is often not brought to light until several months after a trial is over.
Hence the committee has deleted everything in Rule 59 (b) after "judg-
ment," and has provided in Rule 60 (b) for moving for relief from a
judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence within one year after
a judgment is entered. 17
The shortening of the time in which' to appeal is probably advisable.
Thirty (30) days from the entry of judgment should not, under the methods
provided by Rules 72 and 73 for initiating an appeal, be too short a time
in which to appeal.
The new Rule 59 (e) is proposed to take care of situations in which
the desire is to alter or amend a judgment. For instance, in Boaz v. Mutusal
Life Insurance Co.," 8 the court first rendered a judgment of dismissal with-
out prejudice. The defendant thereafter moved to have the judgment read
that the dismissal was with prejudice. This motion was granted.
Mr. Armstrong contends that the ten days permitted by Rules 50 (b),
52 (b), and 59 (b) and (e) in which to move, respectively, for a judgment
notwithstanding a verdict, to amend findings, for a new trial, and to alter
or amend a judgment is too short a time in which to require a busy practi-
tioner to make such a motion. 19 I am inclined to agree with Mr. Armstrong
on this point. There may well be times when it might be physically im-
possible for a lawyer to obtain and put in proper form the material neces-
sary to the making of such a motion. The laudable purpose of not unduly
delaying the proceedings in a case should not lead to unfairness.
Expansion of the title of Rule 59 is suggested to indicate the inclusion
of Rule 59 (e).
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER.
(a) CLERICAL MISTAKES. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
117. Infra p. 92.
118. 146 F. (2d) 321 (C.C.A. 8th, 1945).
119. Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1945) 31 A.B.A.J. 498.
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time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while -the appeal is
pending may be so corrected with, leave of the appellate court.
(b) MISTAKE; INADVERTANCE; EXCUSABLE NEG-
LECT; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC.
On motion (the court), and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding (taken against him through his) on the fol-
lowing grounds: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rude 59 (b); or (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated in-
trinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party.. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,
but in no case (exceeding six months) more that one year after
(such) the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court (1) to entertain an independent action to relieve
a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or (2) to set aside
within one year as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code,
U. S. C., Title 28, § 118, a judgment obtained against a defendant
not actually personally notified, or (3) to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita
querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review,
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining relief from judgments
shall be by motion as prescribed in'these rules or by an independent
action.
The additional sentence which it is recommended should be added to
Rule 60 (a) makes it clear that clerical mistakes in a record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may, during an appellate pro-
ceeding, be corrected by the trial court prior to the docketing of the appeal
in the appellate court. This appears to be in accordance with the view
of Professor Moore12° and of Judge Charles E. Clark in Perlman v. 332
West Seventy-Second Street Company,121 though in that case it was Rule
60 (b) which was involved. The advisory committee seems to believe that
120. 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE (1938) 3276.
121. 127 F. (2d) 716 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
[Vol. 11
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Miller v. United States12 2 and Sclzram v. Safety Investment Company'123
are to the contrary. 2 4 If this is its view, I must differ with it, for the
courts in those cases do not refer to the power of district courts, after
appeal, to deal with errors covered by Rule 60 (a). Rather, they state that
district courts have authority to vacate judgments after appeals have been
taken therefrom.
The addition of the word "final" to the first sentence in Rule 60 (b) is
intended to make clear that interlocutory judgments are not covered by
this rule. The latter type of judgments is subject to the complete power
of the trial court to give the proper relief.12 5
The word "his" is deleted because it is thought that relief should be
granted from a judgment resulting, not only from the mistake or excusable
neglect of a party, but also from such mistake or neglect of others.126
As stated in connection with Rule 59 (b), motions based on newly
discovered evidence would, under the suggested amendments, be covered
by Rule 60 (b) rather than Rule 59 (b), so that more time would be given
to make such motions than would be available under Rule 59 (b). Fraud,
intrinsic and extrinsic,12 7 misrepresentation, and any other misconduct of
an adverse party are suggested as additional grounds for relief from a final
judgment. As the committee says, there is no sound reason for the exclusion
of such misconduct as grounds for relief.'
128
Their inclusion is not only fair, but it removes confusion as to the
proper procedure to use when a judgment is the result of such misconduct.
Thus, it has been held that relief might be granted against a judgment
obtained by extrinsic fraud, if a motion for such relief was made within a
reasonable time after an appeal is taken.1 29 The amendment, if adopted,
would make the procedure in Rule 60 (b) applicable to cases involving
fraud.
RULE 65. INJUNCTIONS.
(c) SECURITY. No restraining order or preliminary in-
122. 114 F. (2d) 267 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
123. 45 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
124. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 70.
125. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 73.
126. Ibid.
127. Intrinsic fraud is fraudulent conduct practiced during the course of a
trial, such as the introduction of forged instruments or perjured testimony, whereas
extrinsic fraud is fraudulent conduct practiced outside of a trial. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Jenkins, 91 F. (2d) 183 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937).
128. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 74.
129. Fiske v. Buder, 125 F. (2d) 841 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942).
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junction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the appli-
cant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of
such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No
such security shall be required of the United States or of an officer
or agency thereof.
A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints
the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting
his liability on the security may be served. His liability may be
enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action.
The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes
may be served on the clerk of the court who shall forthwith mail
copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses are known.
The addition to Rule 65 (c) of the proposed new paragraph would
make it clear that the liability of a surety on the security referred to in
this rule might be enforced by motion. This would provide a remedy similar
to that now existing in Rule 73 (f) for the enforcement of the liability
of sureties on appeal or supersedeas bonds. There seems to be no reason to
treat sureties of these types of bonds differently. Mr. Armstrong believes that
Rule 65 (c) should state specifically that one may recover against sureties
in an independent action, even though the right to do that may be pos-
sible under the rule as it is presently drafted, since the motion provided
for is permissive. He sees no reason why that remedy need be expressly
given in Rule 60 (b) and not in Rule 65 (c).130 There is force in Mr. Arm-
strong's argument. The difference in the words of these rules which permit
motions to be made are not so different that the right also to sue in an in-
dependent action is clear under one and not under the other. The addition
of a clause giving the right, under Rule 65 (c), to bring an independent
action would do no harm and might avoid future uncertainty as to the
matter. If this is done, a similar clause should be added to Rule 73 (f).
RULE 66. RECEIVERS APPOINTED BY FEDERAL COURTS.
An action wherein a receiver has been appointed shall not be
dismissed except by order of the court. A receiver shall have the
capacity to sue in any district court without ancillary appoint-
ment; but actions against a receiver may not be commenced with-
out leave of the court appointing him except when authorized by a
130. Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amaendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1945) 31 A.B.A.J. 497, 500.
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statute of the United States. The practice in the administration of
estates by receivers or by other similar officers appointed by the
court shall be in accordance with the practice heretofore followed
in the courts of the United States or as provided in rules promul-
gated by the district courts, (but all appeals in receivership
proceedings are subject to these rules). In all other respects "the
action in which the appointment of a receiver is sought or which
is brought by or against a receiver is governed by these rides.
The suggested title expands the one now in use to make clear that
this rule applies to receivers appointed by federal, and only federal,
courts.131
The purpose of the first of the sentences suggested for inclusion in
this rule is to bar a dismissal of an action in which a receiver has been
appointed except by order of court. It is felt that one should not be allowed
to oust a court and its officer without consent of the court. It seems logical
that the appointing authority, rather than the person requesting the ap-
pointment, should be the one to dismiss the receiver.
The first clause of the second sentence which the committee proposes
should be added to this rule is intended to change the federal rule that
a receiver appointed by a federal court is not authorized by that appoint-
ment to sue in another jurisdiction unless he is at least a "quasi-assignee. ' 132
There has been much criticism of this view. For example, it has been
said that the "primary purpose of a receivership is to prevent dismember-
ment by gathering together all the assets for the purposes of administration.
There is no more certain way to defeat this end than the practice of denying
aid for no reason other than the vindication of local jurisdiction."', 33 It
has also been stated:
"If the receivership device is to be modernized, cooperation
among courts of the various states and districts is imperative.
They must consider the problem in a broader light. A receiver
appointed by the court of a sister state or district must no longer
be regarded as an alien who would bankrupt local merchants by
the withdrawal of assets to foreign shores. It is a matter of national
economics rather than of local opportunism, but in which the
131. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 77.
132. Sterrett v. Second National Bank, 248 U. S. 73 (1918); Clard v. Willard,
192 U. S. 112 (1934).
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welfare of the community is ultimately better served by the grant-
ing rather than by the denial of comity."' 4
In spite of this criticism, the advisory committee, when it first drafted
this rule, felt, in view of the settled practice of the federal courts, that it
should not then suggest a change in Rule 66. But it is now of the opposite
opinion and believes that the gain in added expedition and lowered cost
of judicial administration which will result from eliminating the necessity
of auxiliary receiverships calls for the suggested modification of that rule. 3 '
Having suggested a provision relating to the right of a receiver to sue,
it was natural for the committee to propose a specific reference to the
bringing of suits against receivers. It has, therefore, in the final clause of
the second sentence which it would add to Rule 66, provided for inclusion
in Rulee 66 of the familiar law that actions may not be commenced against
a federal receiver without leave of the court appointing him except when
a federal statute permits such an action without leave' of court.1 0 28
U. S. C. § 125 is such a statute. It permits a federal receiver of property
to be sued "in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the
business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the
court in which such receiver .. . was appointed.'1' 1
The sentence which the committee suggests affixing to Rule 66 as
it is presently drafted makes the federal rules applicable to all proceedings
relating to the appointment of a federal receiver and to actions brought
by and against such a receiver, unless such proceedings are expressly
excepted from the operation of the rules. Since this sentence covers appeals,
the specific reference to appeals is striken from the rule as presently
drafted. The nature of the usual receivership proceedings is not so different
from that of other proceedings that the rules should not apply to them.
It should be -noticed that Rule 81 (a) (1) excludes bankruptcy proceed-
ings from the application of the rules and that General Order in Bank-
ruptcy 37 states that the rules shall be applicable in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act of the General Orders. Since the
Bankruptcy Act treats of referees, 1 38 the rules do not apply to them.
134. Rose, Extraterritorial Actions by Receivers (1933) 17 MINN. L. REV.
704, 729. See also 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2088-2091.
135. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 77.
136. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126 (1881).
137. See Rule 17 (b) concerning the capacity of a state court receiver to sue
or be sued in a federal court.
138. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 61-71.
[Vol. 11
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1946], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol11/iss2/1
1946] AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULES 97
RULE 68. OFFER OF JUDGMENT.
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a
party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party
an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money
or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then
accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse
party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party
may then file the offer and notice of accepance together with
proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judg-
ment. (If the) An offer (is) not (so) accepted (it) shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissable except in a pro-
ceeding to determine costs. (If the adverse party fails to obtain
a judgment more favorable than that offered, he shall not re-
cover costs in the district court from the time of the offer but
shall pay costs from that time.) If the judgment finally obtained
by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree
must pay and may not recover the costs incurred after the making
of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does
not preclude a subsequent offer.
The only significant change proposed in the third sentence of this
rule is the addition of the words "except in a proceeding to determine
costs." This makes it clear that in, and only in, a proceeding to determine
costs, may evidence of the offer be admitted. Such evidence is necessary
in the proceeding to determine costs in order to show the offeror's right
to costs from the date of the offer.
The only substantial change suggested by the substitution of new
sentences for the last sentence of the present rule is the addition of a
sentence providing that one may make several offers if prior offers have
been rejected. For example, if a new trial is granted after judgment for
the plaintiff, the defendant may make an offer before the second trial, though,
before the first trial, he had made an offer which had not been accepted. 139
Though the original preliminary draft of proposed amendments to the
rules contained the draft of Rule 71a, covering the practice in proceedings
for the condemnation of property for public use, it has been omitted from
the second draft because the committee was unable, after considering the
legitimate objections to its draft of such a rule, to prepare a rule which was
satisfactory to it and to government agencies dealing with condemnation
cases. It decided not to delay the issuance of the second draft of its proposed
139. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 79.
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amendments long enough to prepare a rule on practice in condemnation
proceedings. Mr. Armstrong believes that this was an unwise decision, for
all of the presently contemplated amendments to the rules should be pre-
sented at the same time, since he thinks that frequent amendment of the
rules is unadvisable. He feels that condemnation proceedings have an
important part in federal practice and that there should be a rule covering
it.4 0
RULE 73. APPEAL TO A CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.
(a) WHEN AND HOW TAKEN. When an appeal is per-
mitted by law from a district court to a circuit court of appeals
(and within the time prescribed), (a) the time within which an
appeal may be taken shall be 30 days from the entry of the judg-
ment appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by law, except
that in any action in which the United States is a party the time
shall be 60 days from such entry, and except that upon a showing
of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the
entry of the judgment the district court in any action may extend
the time for appeal not exceeding 30 days from the expiration of
the original time herein prescribed. A party may appeal from a
judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal
within the time provided. Failure of the appellant to take any of
the further steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed
from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only
for such remedies as are specified in this rule or, when no remedy
is specified, for such action as the appellate court deems appro-
priate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. If an appeal
has not been docketed, the parties, with the approval of the
district court, may dismiss the appeal by stipulation filed in that
court, or that court may dismiss the appeal upon motion and notice
by the appellant. The running of the time for appeal as provided
in this subdivision is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant
to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for
appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be
computed from the entry of any of the following orders made upon
a timely motion -under such- rles: Granting or denying a motion
for judgment under Rule 50 (b); or granting or denying a motion
under Rule 52 (b) or Rule 59 (e) to amend or made additional
findings of fact or to alter or amend the judgment in more than
purely formal or mechanical aspects; or denying a motion for a
new trial under Rule 59 (b).
140. Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rudes of
Civil Procedure (1945) 31 A.B.A.J. 500, 533.
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(g) DOCKETING AND RECORD ON APPEAL. The record
on appeal as provided for in Rules 75 and 76 shall be filed with
the appellate court and the (action) appeal there docketed within
40 days from the date of filing the notice of appeal; except that,
when more than one appeal is taken from the same judgment to the
same appellate court, the district court may prescribe the time for
filing and docketing, which in no event shall be less than 40 days
from the date of filing the first notice of appeal. In all cases the
district court in its discretion and with or without moion or notice
may extend the time for filing the record on appeal and dockeing the
(action) appeal, if its order for extension is made before the ex-
piration of the period for filing and docketing as originally pre-
scribed or as extended by a previous order, but the district court
shall not extend the time to a day more than 90 days from the
date of filing the first notice of appeal.
The proposed change in the first sentence of Rule 73 (a) fixes the
usual time within which one may appeal a case at thirty days from the
entry of the judgment appealed from unless a statute provides for a
shorter time, except that the United States shall have sixty (60) days
from such entry, and except that one may have not to exceed thirty (30)
more days in which to appeal, if his failure to appeal within the usual time
in which to do so has been caused by excusable failure to learn of the entry
of judgment.
Since one may initiate an appeal merely by filing a notice, thirty (30)
days should usually be ample time within which to appeal. After three
years in government work at Washington I am content to let the govern-
ment have sixty (60) days in which to appeal, for I know how many
supervisions there must be of a decision to appeal. I doubt that the com-
mittee members are very well versed in government practice or they would
have made the sixty (60) days six months. Of course, it would not be right
to place real responsibility on the person whose business it is initially to
determine whether a case should be appealed and to provide for a single
supervision of that decision.
The exception in case of a delay in appealing caused by an excusable
failure to discover that a judgment has been entered is justifiable. This
will eliminate the need of a court's vacating and reentering a judgment, as
the court did in Hill v. Hawes'4' in order to give relief in such a case.
141. See 320 U. S. 520 (1944) which reversed the decision in 132 F. (2d) 569
(App. D. C. 1942), which had, in turn, decided that the action of the district judge
did not lengthen the time in which appeal could be taken.
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The first sentence which the committee recommends should be added
at the end of Rule 73 (a) allows a district court to approve the dismissal
of an appeal after an appeal has been taken, but before it is docketed.
This is contrary to present law which is that a district court, after an appeal
has been taken, has no authority to act in derogation of the appeal.1 42 The
change is advisable, since it will obviate the trouble and expense of docket-
ing the case in the appellate court and dismissing it there.
The final sentence which the committee advises should be added to
Rule 73 (a) provides that the running of the time for appeal is tolled by
motions under Rules 50 (b), 52 (b), 59 (b), and 59 (e) and that the full
time for appeal begins to run anew from the entry of orders made in con-
nection with such motions. This incorporates the usual law in rule form. 143
This rule does not enlarge the time for taking action under any of the
rules referred to..4 4
The proposed changes in Rule 73 (g) provide that the periods re-
ferred to therein shall begin to run from the day a notice of appeal is filed
not from the date of the notice. This surely was what was intended by the
rule as it was originally written. Otherwise one might, for example, date an
appeal much later than the day on which it was filed and thereby have
much more time in which to file the record on appeal and to docket said
appeal than was intended to be given him. Indeed, the dangers of a literal
interpretation of the present form of this rule have been seen, and it has
been treated as though it contained the word "filing" at the points where it
is now suggested that that word should be inserted.14 This result has also
been reached on the grounds that Rule 75 (g) provides that the record
shall include the notice of appeal with the date of filing and that the ad-
visory committee's form of notice of appeal does not provide for the
notice to be dated.14 6
142. Miller v. United States, 114 F. (2d) 267 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940); Fiske v.
Wallace, 115 F. (2d) 1003 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940); Schram v. Safety Investment Co.,
45 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Mich. 1942); Ex parte Chin Ben Shim, 2 F.R.D. 50
(D. Mass. 1941).
143. Aspen Mining & Smelting Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 31 (1893); Leishman
v. Asso Elec. Co., 318 U. S.. 203 (1943); Neely v. Merchants Trust Co. of Red
Bank, N. J., 110 F. (2d) 525 (C.C.A. 3d, 1940); Burke v. Canfield, 111 F. (2d)
526 (App. D. C. 1940).
144. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 87-88.
145. In re Guanajuato Reduction & Mines Co., 29 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.J. 1939).
146. Ilsen and Hone, Federal Appellate Practice as Affected by the New Rules
of Civil Procedure (1939) 24 MINN. L. REV. 1, 45.
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It is properly suggested that the Word "appeal," which applies more
exactly to the subject matter of Rule 75 (g) than does the word "action"
should replace the latter word.
RULE 75. RECORD ON APPEAL TO A CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS.
(a) DESIGNATION OF CONTENTS OF RECORD ON
APPEAL. Promptly after an appeal to a circuit court of appeals is
taken, the appellant shall serve upon the appellee and file with the
district court a designation of the portions of the record, proceed-
ings, and evidence to be contained in the record on appeal, unless
the appellee has already served and filed a designation. Within 10
days thereafter any other party to the appeal may serve and file a
designation of additional portions of the record, proceedings, and
evidence to be included. If the appellee files the original designa-
tion, the pailties shall proceed under subdivision (b) of this rule
as if the appellee were the appellant.
(b) TRANSCRIPT. If there be designated for inclusion any
evidence or proceedings at a trial or hearing which was steno-
graphically reported, the appellant shall file with his designation
(two copies) a copy of the reporter's transcript of the evidence
or proceedings included in his designation. If the designation in-
cludes only part of the reporter's transcript, the appellant shall
file (two copies) a copy of such additional parts thereof as the
appellee may need to enable him to designate and file the parts he
desires to have added, and if the appellant fails to do so the court
on motion may require him to furnish the additional parts needed.
(One of the copies) The copy so filed by the appellant shall be
available for the use of the other parties (and for use in the appel-
late court in printing the record.)In the event that a copy of 'the
reporter's transcript or the necessary portions thereof is already on
file, the appellant shall not be required to file an additional copy.
When the rules of the circuit court of appeals so require, the appel-
lant shall furnish a second copy of the transcript for use in the
appellate court.
(d) STATEMENT OF POINTS. (If) No assignment of
errors need be incorporated in the record on appeal, but if the appel-
lant does not designate for inclusion the complete record and all
the proceedings and evidence in the action, he shall serve with his
designation a concise statement of the points on which he intends
to rely on the appeal.
(g) RECORD TO BE PREPARED BY CLERK-NECES-
SARY PARTS. The- clerk of the district court, under his hand and
1946]
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the seal of the court, shall transmit to the appellate court a true
copy of the matter designated by the parties, but shall always in-
clude, whether or not designated, copies of the following: the
material pleadings without unnecessary duplication; the verdict
or the findings of fact and conclusions of law together with the
direction for the entry of judgment thereon; in an action tried
without a jury, the master's report, if any; the opinion; the judg-
ment or part thereof appealed from; the notice of appeal with date
of filing; the designations or stipulations of the parties as to matter
to be included in the record; and any statement by the appellant
of the points on which he intends to rely. The matter so certified
and transmitted constitutes the record of appeal. The clerk shall
transmit with the record on appeal a copy thereof (for use in
printing the record if) when a copy is required by the rules of the
circuit court of appeals. The copy of the transcript filed as provided
in subdivision (b) of this rule shall be certified by the clerk as a part
of the record on appeal and the clerk may not require an addi-
tional copy as a requisite to certification.
(h) POWER OF COURT TO CORRECT OR MODIFY
RECORD. It is not necessary for the record on appeal to be ap-
proved by the district court or judge thereof except as provided in
subdivisions (m) and (n) of this rule, but, if any difference arises
as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the
district court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by
that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If any-
hing material to either party is omitted from the record on appeal
by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipula-
tion, or the district court, either before or after the record is
transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court, on a
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the
omission or misstatement shall be corrected, and if necessary that
a supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted by the
clerk of the district court. All dther questions as to the content and
form of the record shall be presented to the circuit court of appeals.
(m) IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPEALS. Upon leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis, the district court may by order specify some
differeitt and more economical manner by which, the record on
appeal may be prepared and settled, to the end that the appellant
may be enabled to present his case to the appellate court.
(.n) APPEALS WHEN NO STENOGRAPHIC REPORT
WAS MADE. In the evegt no stenographic report of the evidence
or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, the appellant may
prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best
available means, including his recollection, for use instead of a
[Vol. 11
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stenographic transcript. This statement shall be served on the
appellee who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto
within 10 days after service upon him. Thereupon the statement,
with. the objections or proposed amendments, shall be submitted
to the district court for settlement and approval, and as settled and
approved shall be included by the clerk of the court in the record
on appeal.
(o) RULE FOR TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL PAPERS.
Whenever a circuit court of appeals provides by rule for the hear-
ing of appeals on -the original papers, the clerk of the district court
shall transmit them to the appellate court in lieu of the copies pro-
vided by this Rule 75. The transmittal shall be within such time
or extended time as is provided in Rule 73 (g), except that the
district court by order may fix a shorter time. The clerk shall
transmit all the, original papers in the file dealing with the action
or the proceeding in which the appeal is taken, with the exception
of such omissions as are agreed upon by written stipulation of the
parties on file, and shall append his ceritficate reasonably identify-
ing the papers transmitted. If a transcript of the testimony is on
file the clerk shall transmit that also; otherwise the appellant shall
file with the clerk for transmission such transcript of the -testimony
as he deems necessary for his appeal subject to the right of an
appellee either to file additional portions or to procure an order
from the district court requiring the appellant to do so. After the
appeal has been disposed of, the papers shall be returned to the
custody of the district court. The provisions of subdivisions (h), (j),
(k), (1), (m), and (n) shall be applicable but with reference to the
original papers as herein provided rather than to a copy or copies.
By the recommended changes in Rule 75 (a) an appellee is permitted
to serve and file the initial designation of materials to be contained in the
record on appeal. This would be an antidote to delaying tactics of an
appellant. At the same time the appellant is protected, as he is deemed an
appellee under Rule 75 (b), if an appellee serves and files the initial
designation.147
The sole change in Rule 75 (b) is to require the filing of only one
copy of the transcript unless the rules of a circuit court require the filing
of a second copy. It appears to be the belief of a majority of circuit court
clerks that only one copy is necessary. 4 Of course, this is true when the
record is printed. The advisory committee gives no explanation of its
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reason for deleting the provision that the copy of the transcript which is
filed shall be available for the use in the appellate court in printing the
record but for retaining the provision that such record shall be available
for the use of the parties who have not filed it. It will be noticed that the
phrase "for use in printing the record" has also been deleted from Rule
75 (g). I am advised by Mr. E. E. Koch, Clerk of the United States Circuit
Court for the eighth circuit, that the original certified typewritten trans-
cript of the record from the district court is used in printing the record.
A second copy of the transcript of the record has not, he says, been required
in his circuit for some time.
It is proposed to commence Rule 75 (d) with a statement that assign-
ments of error need not be incorporated in the record on appeal. Apparently
the word "shall" rather than "need" should be used if the intention of the
advisory committee is to be accurately stated, for the comment on this
rule reads: "The phrase added at the beginning of subdivision (d) emphasizes
that assignments of error are not to be required or included in the record
on appeal." It would be well for the committee to make the suggested
change in its proposal, if its purpose is not to permit assignments of error.
If the Supreme Court wishes definitely to abolish assignments of error,
the addition to Rule 75 (d) of the suggested clause is advisable. Though some
courts have held that the rule as now drafted has abolished the use of
assignments of error,149 at least one court has held to the contrary. It has
said that the present provision as to the serving of a statement of points
on which an appellant intends to rely is merely to assist an appellee to
decide what further portions of the proceedings he wishes to have included
in the record. This the court declares does not bar a court from requiring
assignments of error for the purpose of protecting the interests of the
appellee and of facilitating the work of the court."
The committee also intends, by addition of the assignment of errors
clause, to abolish cross-assignments of error which would otherwise be in
order under such a rule as 50 (b)."5' For instance, if the defendant was
granted a judgment non obstante veredicto, on appeal by the plaintiff the
149. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Snyder, 109 F. (2d) 469
(C.C.A. 6th, 1940); Starfred Properties, Inc. v. Etttinger. 131 F. (2d) 575 (C.C.A.
2d, 1943). See to the same effect, Commentary, 7 Fed Rules Serv. 980.
150. Keeley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 113 F. (2d) 633, 635-636 (C.C.A.
7th 1940).
151. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 94.
[Vol. 11
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1946], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol11/iss2/1
1946] AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULES 105
defendant might wish to assign legal errors so that he could possibly obtain
a new trial, if the plaintiff won on his appeal. The right to cross-assign-
ments is projected into the picture by a sentence in Montgomery Ward &
Company v. Duncan to the effect that, in the type of case just suggested,
the court saw no reason why the appellee might not, and should not, cross-
assign error in the appellant'§ appeal to rulings of law at the trial, so that,
if the appellate court reversed the order for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, it might pass on the errors of law which the appellee asserted
nullified the judgment on the verdict.152
The recommended deletion in the third sentence of Rule 75 (g), the
substitution of the word "when" therefor, and the addition of a sentence
to that rule are made because of the change in Rule 75 (b) requiring but
one copy of the transcript except when a further copy is required by a rule
of the circuit court to which an appeal is taken. 58
The suggested addition to the title of Rule 75 (h) of the word "modify"
is to more accurately indicate the full breadth of the rule than does the
present title.' "
Because of the proposed addition to the rules of Rules 75 (m) and (n),
which, in certain cases, require approval by district courts of the record
on appeal, the addition to Rule 75 (b) of the phrase "except as provided
in subdivisions (m) and (n) of this rule" is necessary.
The recommended addition of the new sentence at the end of Rule
75 (h) is to make clear the boundary between the authority of the district
courts and circuits of appeals in connection with the making of decisions
concerning the content and form of records.' 5' The idea of such a provision
is admirable, but it should come at the end of Rule 75 rather than in Rule
75 (h), since later subdivisions of Rule 75 contain provisions for decisions
by district courts concerning the content and form of records on appeal.
The proposal to add subdivision (m) to this rule is commendable, for
it is well to specifically provide that district courts may make orders which
will make effective the privilege given to appellants to appeal as paupers.
In some cases district courts, after extending such a privilege, have tempor-
arily negatived the effect thereof by ordering the appellant to file reporter's
152. 311 U. S. 243, 254 (1940). See to the same effect, 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, Cum. Supp. 106-109; Koenigsberger, Suggestions for Changes in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 1010, 1011.
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transcripts. If it had not been that the appellate courts involved reversed
those orders,56 the appellants, because of lack of funds, could not have
appealed.
It would probably be wise to adopt proposed Rule 75 (n). Although
provision is now made for court reporters in district court cases, it is pos-
sible under the new law that in civil cases, by agreement of the parties
with court approval, the proceedings will not be officially reported.1 "7
Hence, some method should be provided for preparing a record in such
cases.
The suggested provision by Rule 75 (o) for appeal by transmission of
original papers is also advisable. Sometimes such an appeal would be very
helpful, as in cases involving the appearance of vital documents. Also, in
some cases it may be desirable to avoid the delay and expense involved
in the preparation of copies. This addition to the rules has been suggested
by some circuit judges."85
RULE 77. DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS.
(d) NOTICE OF ORDERS OR JUDGMENTS. Immediately
upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall serve a notice
of the entry by mail in the manner provided for in Rule 5 upon
every party affected thereby who is not in default for failure to
appear, and shall make a note in the docket of mailing. Such mail-
ing is sufficient notice for all purposes for which notice of the entry
of an order is required by these rules; but any party may in addi-
tion serve a notice of such entry in the manner provided in Rule
5 for the service of papers. Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk
shall not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court
to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed by
law or by these rules, except as permitted in Ride 73 (a).
The addition to Rule 77 of the sentence set forth above is to make clear
that the mere fact that a clerk has failed to send a party a notice of an
entry of judgment will not relieve the party of the duty to appeal within
the time provided for by rule or statute. The suggested addition to this
rule seems to have been prompted by the decision in Hill v. Hawes,""
which has already been discussed in connection with Rule 73 (a). It will
156. Hall v. Gordon, 119 F. (2d) 463 (App. D. C. 1941); Middleton v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 119 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 9 (a).
158. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 95-96.
159. 320 U. S. 520 (1944).
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be recalled that the Supreme Court held in that case that the district court
effectively lengthened the time for appeal by vacating the judgment after
the time for appeal had passed and by then entering another judgment.
It is feared that, if this is permitted, now that courts have control of
judgments after the terms at which they are rendered, the right to appeal
may be indefinitely extended and the finality of judgments may be unduly
delayed., 0 This fear is not unfounded.
RULE 79. BOOKS AND RECORDS KEPT BY THE CLERKS
AND ENTRIES THEREIN.
(a) CIVIL DOCKET. The clerk shall keep a book known as
"civil docket" of such form and style as may be prescribed by the
(Attorney General under the authority of the Act of June 30,
1906, e. 3914, § 1 (34 Stat. 754), as amended, U. S. C. Title 28,
§ 568, or other statutory authority,) Director of the Administra-
tive office of the United States Courts Withk the approval of the
Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, and shall enter therein
each civil action to which these rules are .made applicable. Actions
shall be assigned consecutive numbers. The file number of each
action shall be noted on the folio of the docket whereon the first
entry of the action is made. All papers filed with the clerk, all
process issued and returns made thereon, all appearances, orders,
verdicts, and judgments shall be noted chronologically in the civil
docket on the folio assigned to the action and shall be marked with
its file number. These notations shall be brief but shall show the
nature of each paper filed or writ issued and the substance of each
order or judgment of the court and of the returns showing execu-
tion of process. The notation of an order or judgment shall shov
the date the notation is made. When in an action trial by jury has
been properly demanded or ordered the clerk shall enter the word
"jury" on the folio assigned to that action.
(b) CIVIL (ORDER BOOK) JUDGMENTS AND OR-
DERS. The clerk shall (also) keep (a book for civil actions en-
titled "civil order book" in which shall be kept in the sequence
of their making exact copies of all final judgments and orders,
all orders,) in such, form and manner as the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United Stdtes Courts with the approval
of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges may prescribe,
a correct copy of every final judgment or appealable order, or order
affecting title to or lien upon real or personal property, (all ap-
pealable orders,) and such other orders as the court may direct.
160. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 97-98.
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(c) INDICES; CALENDARS. (Separate and) Suitable in-
dices of the civil docket and of (the) civil (order book) judg-
ments and orders of the nature referred to in subdivision (b) of
this rule shall be kept by the clerk under the direction of the court.
There shall be prepared under the direction of the court calendars
of all actions ready for trial, which shall distinguish "jury actions"
from "court actions."
(d) OTHER BOOKS AND RECORDS OF THE CLERK.
The clerk shall also keep such other books or records as may from
time to time be required by the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts with the approval of the Judi-
cial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.
The proposed changes in Rule 79 (a) are necessitated by enactment
of statutes providing for the creation of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, the director of which, under the supervision and
direction of the conference of senior circuit judges, has charge of all admin-
istrative matters relating to the offices of court clerks.18'
The recommended changes in Rule 79 (b) are the result of the statutes
just referred to and to the fact that the advisory committee believes that
the records referred to in his rule should not necessarily be kept in books,
but that space-saving methods of recording, such as micro-photography,
should be permitted.12
The suggested change in Rule 79 (c) deleting the words "order book"
and substituting the words "judgments and orders of the -nature referred
to in subdivision (b) of this rule" is necessitated by the proposed change
in Rule 79 (b), which permits records to be kept in something other than
books. Deletion of the words "separate and" is the result of the conclusion
bythe advisory committee that to require separate indices of the docket,
judgments, and orders is too rigid a rule, which may unduly increase the
labor needed to make the indices and to search them. It believes that
the number of indices to be used should be left to administrative discre-
tion.163 The addition to Rule 79 of subdivision (d) is advisable, since the
Administration Office should be able to keep records not mentioned in this
rule.164
Subdivisions (a) and (b) of Rule 80 have been abrogated because,
161. 28 U.S.C. §§ 444, 446.
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as stated in connection with the discussion of Rule 75 (n), statutory pro-
vision has now been made for official reporters in federal courts.
1 65
The questions have arisen as to what procedure should be used in a
proceeding to enforce a subpoena and in an appeal from a decision in such
a proceeding. It has been held that the new federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure apply in the original proceeding,166 unless there is a special statute
covering a particular type of case,'1 67 and that those rules apply in all
cases of appeals. 168 The sentence added to Rule 81 (a) (3) is in accord
with these rulings.
The change in the section number in Rule 81 (a) (6) is necessary
because Section 405 of Title 8 of U. S. C. has been repealed and section 738
has replaced it. Subdivision (b) thereof gives a defendant in a proceeding
to cancel hi scertificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud or illegal-
ity sixty days after personal notice of the proceeding in which to answer
and provides for notice by publication in the manner provided for publi-
cation in the state or place in which the proceeding is brought, if the natur-
alized person is absent from the United States or from the judicial district
in which he had his last residence. The committee rightly believes that
reference to the applicable portion of the proper statute is sufficient and
therefore suggests the deletion of the words setting forth the term of the
statute relating to the length of time given one to file an answer. 69
The cause of he proposed addition to Rule 81 (c) of the clause limit-
ing the time in which to answer the petition in a case which is removed
from a state to a federal court is the existence of some state laws permitting
one to delay answering a petition for a term unless the petition is filed
within a certain time before a term begins. In some localities, if one re-
moves a case a shorter time before the beginning of term than is required
to force one to answer at the next term, the answer may be delayed for
several months. Incorporation in the rule of this clause is advisable.
Though many courts have held that the forms in the appendix to the
165. 28 U.S.C. § 9 (a).
166. Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F. (2d) 731, 734 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942).
167. Cudahy Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 117 F. (2d)
692, 694 (C.C.A. 10th, 1941); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 122 F. (2d) 450, 451 (C.C.A. 6th, 1941).
168. McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61, 65 (1939); Perkins v. Endicott
Johnson Corporation, 128 F. (2d) 208, 226, 227 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942); Walling v. News
Printing Co., Inc., 148 F. (2d) 57 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945).
169. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 107.
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rules are sufficient some have held that they may not be.1 7 0 The recom-
mended addition to Rule 84 is intended to make clear that the forms are
adequate under the rules.171
This is the story of the proposed amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts. And a very important story it is, not
only for the lawyers who practice in our federal courts, but for all Missouri
lawyers, for so many of the suggested changes are in rules which are very
much like our local statutes. Thus federal Rules 6(b), 6(c), 7(a), 12(b),
12(c), 12(e), 12(f), 12(h), 13(i), 14(a), 24(a), 24(b), 33, 34, 36, 41(b)
and 50(b), in all of which substantial changes are proposed by the ad-
visory committee, are very much like the corresponding sections 6(b),
6(c), 32, 61, 68, 63, 64, 66, 20, 21(a), 21(b), 85, 86, 88, 100, and 113 of
our present procedure code. We are now considering changes in that code.
We should consider very carefully whether the changes recommended by the
advisory committee of the United States Supreme Court, or others, should
be made in the sections above referred to. I am sure that our own Supreme
Court committee on civil procedure would be grateful to the lawyers of
this state if they would suggest any changes in our civil procedure which
they think are advisable. The chairman of that committee is Mr. Ray
Bond of Joplin, Missouri.
170. Foley-Carter Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 128 F. (2d) 718(C.C.A. 5th, 1942); Washburn v. Moorman, 25 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1938);
Employers' Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Blue Line Transfer Co., 2 F.R.D.
121 (W.D. Mo. 1941).
171. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 108.
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